- Deep Contractions
at the NCAA
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- By Andrew Zimbalist
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- Andrew Zimbalist is Robert
A. Woods Professor of Economics at Smith and in 1998 was named
Village Voice Sports Journalist of the Year. This essay is adapted
from the introduction to his latest book, Unpaid Professionals:
Commercialism and Conflict in Big-Time College Sports, recently
published by Princeton University Press and chosen as one of
the Top 10 Sports Books of 1999 by Booklist, the magazine of
the American Library Association.
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What is the basic purpose of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association? The first page of its 1997-98
manual claims that the NCAA exists "to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and
the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by doing
so, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports."
The facts strongly suggest otherwise.
In December 1996, Notre Dame was playing
its final regular-season football game against the University
of Southern California. The Notre Dame placekicker
missed an extra point at the end of the fourth quarter. The Fighting
Irish went on to lose, 27-21, in overtime-thereby forfeiting
a shot at an Alliance Bowl game that would have garnered Notre
Dame a cool $8 million. The placekicker blew an $8 million extra
point!
Notre Dame has a $45 million contract
with NBC to televise its regular-season football games. The major
conferences have a $700 million contract with ABC to televise
the bowl championship series. The NCAA has a $1.725 billion contract
with CBS to broadcast its annual men's basketball tournament.
Like the professional leagues, the
NCAA and its leading colleges promote their own lines of licensed
clothing. Like the National Basketball Association and the National
Football League, the NCAA has its own traveling tent show, NCAA
Hoop City. The association has its own marketing division. Its
corporate sponsorships increased roughly sevenfold during the
'90s, with guaranteed income of $75 million between 1997 and
2002. It has its own real estate subsidiary and even its own
Learjet. In 1997 the city of Indianapolis offered to build the
NCAA a new headquarters and to provide an estimated $50 million
in subsidies-whereupon the association vacated Kansas City, leaving
behind 300 employees and 45 years of its history.
The NCAA's total budget, which surpassed
$270 million in 1997-98, has grown at an annual rate of 15.0
percent since 1982. The association's executive director, Cedric
Dempsey, has done even better: as part of a new five-year deal,
in fiscal 1997 his salary and benefits package grew 30.2 percent,
to $647,000. (Dempsey had replaced Dick Schultz in 1993, when
the latter ran into ethical problems. As punishment, the association
gave Schultz a golden parachute worth at least $700,000.)
Dempsey also gets treated well when
he attends the Final Four of the annual basketball tournament.
The Kansas City Star reported that "the manual for cities
holding Final Fours requires a series of gifts to be delivered
every night to the hotel rooms of NCAA officials. These mementos
cost Indianapolis an estimated $25,000 [in March 1997]. At a
minimum, gifts for each official included a Samsonite suit bag,
a Final Four ticket embedded in Lucite, a Limoges porcelain basketball
and Steuben glass." And to maximize revenue at the Final
Four, the NCAA has spurned basketball's traditional smaller venues
for cavernous arenas such as the New Orleans Superdome, the San
Antonio Alamodome, the St. Louis Trans World Dome, the Indianapolis
RCA Dome and the Georgia Dome, all of which seat more than 40,000.
Many NCAA schools find the big bucks
dangling before their eyes too alluring to be sacrificed to respect
for the rules. Schools cheat-by arranging to help their prospective
athletes pass standardized tests, by providing illegal payments
to their recruits, by setting up special rinky-dink curricula
so their athletes can stay qualified. And when one school cheats,
others feel compelled to follow. The NCAA responds by passing
new rules to curtail the cheating. Sometimes they're enforced,
sometimes not, but rarely do the penalties draw blood. The association
seems to think that the solution to all this lies in having more
rules: its manual grew from 161 6x8-inch pages in 1970-71 to
579 8x11-inch pages in 1996-97. In 1998-99 it ballooned to three
volumes (in the larger size, of course) with a total of 1,268
pages.
What is "the clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports"?
It certainly isn't the presence or absence of commercialism and
corporate interests. Rather, two differences stand out. First,
unlike their handsomely remunerated coaches and athletic directors
(ADs), college athletes don't get paid. Second, the NCAA and
its member schools, construed as amateur organizations promoting
an educational mission, do not pay taxes on their millions from
TV deals, sponsorships, licensing or Final Four tickets.
The tension between professional and
amateur in college sports creates myriad contradictions. And
as the NCAA can well attest, in today's America contradictions
mean litigation.
Consider the legal toll on the NCAA
in 1997-98. A long-standing dispute with basketball coach Jerry
Tarkanian over due process was settled for a hefty $2.5 million
in the coach's favor. The association was told by the 3rd Circuit
Court of Appeals in Philadelphia that since NCAA schools receive
federal funds, the association itself is subject to Title IX
(federal gender-equity rules); among other things, this ruling
called into question the legality of NCAA regulations about scholarships
for athletes. And, potentially most significant, the association
was hit with a $67 million court judgment over one of its rules
that restricts the earnings of certain coaches. This ruling,
if it stands, might be used to challenge a panoply of NCAA restrictions
on the operation of markets, including prohibitions on paying
athletes, restrictions on how much athletes can earn outside
their sport, and limitations on the number of games played or
the number of players on a team. The ruling might ultimately
challenge the association's whole modus operandi.
In the end, college athletics leads
a schizophrenic existence, encompassing both amateur and professional
elements. The courts, the IRS and sometimes the universities
themselves cannot seem to decide whether to treat intercollegiate
athletics as part of the educational process or as a business.
The NCAA claims that it manages college sports in a way that
promotes both the goals of higher education and the financial
condition of the university. Critics say it does neither.
The NCAA wants it both ways. When confronted
by the challenges of Title IX and gender equity, the association
and its member schools want to be treated as businesses. ADs
argue that it is justifiable to put more resources into men's
than women's sports, because men's sports generate more revenue.
But when the IRS knocks on its door, the NCAA and its member
schools want their special tax exemptions as part of the nonprofit
educational establishment, and claim special amateur status to
avoid paying their athletes. We need to determine where these
contradictions came from, how they evolved and what can be done
about them.
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